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Twelve Angrier Men: Enforcing Verdict Accountability in 
Criminal Jury Trials 
Alice Curci* 
“The general verdict is as inscrutable and essentially as mysterious as the 
judgment which issued from the ancient oracle at Delphi. Both stand on 
the same foundation – a presumption of wisdom.” 
- Edson R. Sunderland1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In modern American criminal practice, jury deliberations are conducted 
in secret and the verdicts they render are inscrutable. Jury verdicts were 
initially intended as a check on arbitrary power, free from the influence of 
untrained judges who served at the pleasure of the King.2 They represented 
a necessary counter to governmental authority, providing a degree of self-
governance and political power to members of the local community in 
assessing their legal claims and enforcing their legal rights.3  
But times have changed. Judges now undergo extensive legal training. 
They are either democratically elected or appointed by democratically 
elected officials, and enforce laws drafted by democratically elected 
representatives. Meanwhile, research suggests that jurors do not 
understand a large portion of jury instructions, and that they might be 
basing their verdicts on incorrect understandings of the law.4 In addition, 
 
*. J.D. 2019, Washington University School of Law. 
1. Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920); see also 
Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948) (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, 
Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920)).  
2. Jon P. McClanahan, The "True” Right to Trial by Jury: The Founders' Formulation and Its 
Demise, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 791, 799 (2009).  
3. Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone's Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the 
Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 
1201 (2014); Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 422 (1996).  
4. Empirical studies of mock juries found that “most jurors failed to absorb a great many of the 
judge's instructions and that the process of deliberation did not correct this problem,” and that when 
tested on their comprehension of the law, the jurors’ average number of correct answers “was not 
significantly better than chance.” Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches 
Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589, 634 (1997); Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 218, 223 (1989); 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems 
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despite promising during voir dire to keep an open mind, apply the law 
appropriately, and return a verdict based solely on the evidence presented, 
jurors often fail to check their biases at the door of the deliberation room.5 
Feeling pressured to reach an agreement and sometimes eager to return to 
their lives, jurors have been known to compromise their views on guilt or 
innocence so as to achieve unanimous support for a “negotiated mix of 
convictions and acquittals,” often a lesser included charge, in order to 
avoid deadlock.6 Despite this substantial potential for error, jury verdicts 
are virtually unreviewable.7 The unpredictability of jury outcomes is often 
cited as a reason to opt for plea bargains, and the cloak of mystery cast 
over jury deliberations might contribute to the ever-rising number of 
defendants choosing this option rather than taking their chances at trial.8 
Why then, in a system of checks and balances, do we still allow the power 
of the criminal jury to go essentially unchecked? 
 
and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 788 (2000); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. 
Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan 
Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401 (1990); Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie 
Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the 
Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL'Y & L. 677 (2000); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing 
Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995),; Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving 
. . . but the Words Aren't Clear: Dissecting the Presumption That Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 
MO. L. REV. 163 (2004). As Judge Frank Jerome commented in Skidmore v. Ohio, “[p]erhaps the least 
desirable feature of the general verdict, … is … the assumption that the jury fully comprehends the 
judge's instructions concerning the applicable substantive rules.” Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 61.  
5. See Nicole B. Cásarez, Examining the Evidence: Post-Verdict Interviews and the Jury System, 
25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 499 passim (2003). Research shows that juror bias negatively 
impacts defendants in a variety of ways, going beyond racial and gender discrimination. See, e.g., 
David L. Wiley, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance Discrimination in American Criminal 
Trials, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 193 (1995). Moreover, bias can have an indirect impact on the verdict when 
it affects group dynamics during deliberations. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury 
Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593 (1987).  
6. Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 771, 782 (1998). See also Allison Orr Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 
GEO. L.J 1567, 1569 (2011) (stating that compromise jury verdicts result of both the “internal drive to 
compromise” and “external pressure to reach a collective decision.”); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New 
Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass 
R. Sunstein ed., 2000)).  
7. See infra, notes 37-67.  
8. See Albert V. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory Challenges, 
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 153–55 (1989); see also LINDSEY DEVERS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, RESEARCH SUMMARY: PLEA & CHARGE 
BARGAINING (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/13
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This Note argues that justice would be better served if criminal juries 
were required to return not only a verdict, but also the underlying 
rationale. While many continue to question the ability of the lay jury to 
provide a reasoned opinion, a solution modeled after the Spanish system 
would allow our jurors to accomplish this task without jeopardizing their 
independence from the court.9 After independently reaching a verdict 
through deliberations, a jury should be able to request the assistance of an 
officer of the court, trained in the law, to express their reasoning and 
findings.10 These could then be reviewed by the trial judge and serve as an 
additional basis for appellate review.11 
Part II of this Note will examine the origins of the inscrutability of jury 
verdicts in criminal trials and the evolution of the law to the present day. 
Part III will look at the issues raised by the low standard of accountability 
to which criminal juries are held with respect to criminal defendants, 
society, and the justice system itself. Lastly, Part IV will explore 
alternatives to the inscrutable, unreviewable verdict and attempt to provide 
a viable framework for reform to reduce uncertainty and promote 
accountability and error correction. Such measures would not be easy to 
implement; they would likely make deliberations longer and would 
certainly make our twelve angry men even angrier. But if that is the price 
to fulfill one of our most cherished constitutional rights, then it is one we 
should all be willing to pay. 
 
I. HISTORY 
 
The inscrutability of jury verdicts traces its roots as far back as twelfth-
century England, where it emerged from the ashes of the then-favored 
methods of proof: compurgation, trial by battle, and trial by ordeal.12 
 
9. See infra, notes 125–126.  
10. Michael Csere, Note, Reasoned Criminal Verdicts in the Netherlands and Spain: Implications 
for Juries in the United States, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 415, 422 (2013).  
11. Id.  
12. Compurgation required an accused to prove his or her innocence by swearing under oath, with 
the support of a specified number of oath-helpers, usually six or twelve, that could attest to his good 
character. Trial by battle, an import of the Norman conquest, allowed for guilt or innocence to be 
determined by success in combat. Lastly, trial by ordeal was most commonly performed either by 
immersion in cold water, or through exposure to a hot iron, and rested on the belief that God would not 
allow for an innocent man to be injured or die as a result of the ordeal. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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These ancient forms of trial were all premised on some ideal of divine 
justice, where the issue of guilt or innocence was submitted to the 
“judgment of God,” who would save the innocent from death in battle or 
ordeal, and would punish perjurers who supported the oath of a guilty 
man.13 As their many flaws became apparent, these archaic and irrational 
modes of trial came under fierce criticism and eventually fell out of 
practice. 14 Pope Innocent III dealt a fatal blow to these practices at the 
Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, when he proscribed the performance of 
religious ceremonies in conjunction with ordeals.15  
It is in this context that the jury trial made its first appearance in 
medieval England and established itself at the heart of the Common Law.16 
The jury system presented some obvious advantages over old methods of 
proof. Among these were the ability to present evidence and the 
presumption that a verdict would be based on human knowledge, insight, 
and inquiry rather than divine intervention.17 Yet, formal records of trials 
from the time show “no notice either of the evidence or of the direction 
given by the judge to the jury.”18 Without evidence or instructions, the jury 
was not that different from the formal tests it sought to replace: rather than 
submitting the justness of one's position to divine judgment, as was 
customary in the ordeals, the issue of innocence was now to be submitted 
“to the essentially inscrutable judgment of a group of fellow citizens.”19 
 
BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 62–67 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1973); WILLIAM 
S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312–321 (3rd ed., rewritten 1922); THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 96-–118 (1929); Diane E. Courselle, 
Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 213–
15 (2005). 
13. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 12, at 68-71. 
14. People started to realize that, through breathing exercises, one could learn how to succeed in the 
water ordeal, and “as far as the ordeal of hot iron was concerned, it was clear that innocence was too 
closely connected with calluses.” Similarly, known criminals would likely fail to find six or twelve 
compurgators within their community, while trial by battle evidently favored knights and wealthy men, 
who could afford to hire the best champions. Id. at 65–69 (internal quotations omitted).  
15. Id.; see also PLUCKNETT, supra note 12, at 106.  
16. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 12, at 71. 
17. Id. 
18. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 317.  
19. Courselle, supra note 12, at 214-15; see also PLUCKNETT, supra note 12, at 125 (“At first, the 
jury was no more regarded as ‘rational’ than the ordeals which it replaced, and just as one did not 
question the judgments of God as shown by the ordeal, so the verdict of a jury was equally inscrutable. 
It is but slowly that the jury was rationalized and regarded as a judicial body.”); United States v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/13
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Whether based on or warranted by any evidence, the jury verdict was just 
as binding on the judge as the ordeals had been: “the vox populi had 
simply taken the place of the final and inscrutable vox Dei.”20  
Despite attempts over time by the English judiciary to rein in the jury’s 
power, the inscrutability of jury verdicts survived the trip across the 
Atlantic and established itself as a key feature of jury trials in the 
American colonies.21 Having outgrown its numinous origin, the 
inscrutability of verdicts was now rooted in the colonial experience itself: 
for “the right to be tried by a jury of one's peers finally exacted from 
the king would be meaningless if the king's judges could call the turn.”22 
Because the jury could not be asked to explain their deliberative process 
nor their verdict, they had the de facto power to “bring in a verdict in the 
teeth of both law and facts.”23 This law-nullifying power proved crucial 
during the American Revolution, when jury verdicts became an important 
tool of defiance and protection against the arbitrary power and abuses of 
the Crown.24 The jury’s ability to return a general verdict of acquittal in 
the face of unpopular laws helped cement its role as a bulwark of liberty.25  
According to Alexander Hamilton, at the Constitutional convention, all 
delegates agreed on the value of trial by jury to safeguard the liberty of 
criminal defendants.26 They did not agree, however, on whether criminal 
 
Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 90203 (2d Cir. 1960) (quoting THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 125 (1929)). HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 317.  
20. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 12, at 71; see also HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 317 (“The 
record tells us that when the jury was first introduced the method by which it arrived at its verdict 
inherited the inscrutability of the judgements of God”). 
21. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 
377, 388–89 (1999). For an overview of judicial control over jury verdicts in the Colonial period, see 
generally Renee B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early 
Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–18 (1996); Martin D. Beirne & Scott 
D. Marrs, Judicial Control Over Questionable Jury Verdicts: Historical Underpinnings of an Age-Old 
Practice, FED. LAW., June 2004, at 23. 
22. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 853 (5th Cir. 1971) (Rives, J., dissenting) (citing Bushel's 
Case, 124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670)).  
23. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); see also Mark DeWolfe Howe, 
Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 584 (1939).  
24. Harrington, supra note 21, at 393.  
25. Id. at 378.  
26. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 83,  
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur 
at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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juries should issue verdicts based on the law as well as on the facts.27 
When the debate was settled about a century later in favor of having juries 
be only the finders of facts,28 it became clear that, due to the widespread 
preference for general, inscrutable verdicts of “guilty” or “not guilty,” the 
point was largely moot. In practice, these verdicts make it “impossible to 
know whether the jurors have judged the facts, the law, or the position of 
the planets.”29 Even Justice Story, as he denied the jury any moral right to 
decide the law “according to their own notions, or pleasure” in U.S. v. 
Battiste, had to acknowledge the futility of the point, by recognizing that a 
general verdict is “necessarily compounded of law and fact.”30  
What this debate suggests, however, is that in guaranteeing a right to 
trial by jury in the Sixth Amendment, the framers did not necessarily 
intend to crystalize the inscrutability of general jury verdicts. This 
inference is confirmed by more recent case law, indicating that there is no 
constitutional requirement that criminal jury verdicts be general and 
inscrutable.31 Still, despite having reached a consensus that juries should 
not be charged with findings of law, courts continue to overwhelmingly 
support the use of general verdicts of “guilty” or “not guilty.”32  
In U.S. v. Spock, for example, the First Circuit observed that the historic 
function of the jury, “tempering the rules of law by common sense,” 
would be hampered if the jury were required to support its verdict with 
 
it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it 
as the very palladium of free government. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
27. DeWolfe Howe, supra note 23, at 588–89. 
28. See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895) (holding that in criminal cases the 
determination of the law is for the court, and not for the jury).  
29. Albert V. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United States, 
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 913 (1994).  
30. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545); see also 
Harrington, supra note 21, at 434.  
31. See, e.g., United States v. O’Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that there is no 
per se rule forbidding special verdicts in criminal trials); Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d 1241, 1245 (1st 
Cir. 1974) (saying that there is no mechanical per se rule of unconstitutionality for all special questions 
in criminal cases); United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (saying that 
“departures from the unqualified general verdict are certainly not breaks with tradition”).  
32. O’Looney, 544 F.2d at 392 (claiming that “as a rule, special verdicts in criminal cases are not 
favored”); see also United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 412 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that “special 
interrogatories to the jury and verdicts are generally looked upon with disfavor in criminal cases”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/13
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reasons. 33 The Court found that the general verdict in criminal trials is 
“one of the most essential features of the right of trial by jury,” and that 
“the removal of this safeguard would violate its design and destroy its 
spirit.” 34 Similarly, in U.S. v. Sababu, the Seventh Circuit maintained that 
special verdicts are disfavored in criminal cases “because they conflict 
with the basic tenet that juries must be free from judicial control and 
pressure in reaching their verdicts.”35 Interestingly, in Sababu, it was the 
defendant who advocated for the removal of this “safeguard,” and 
requested interrogatories to expand on the jury’s general verdict.36  Thus a 
tool designed to protect the rights of criminal defendants inured to the 
benefit of the government who could get a jury to convict without 
agreement on a coherent narrative.   
 Courts are so committed to the idea that we should not inquire any 
further into the verdict than a general finding of guilt, that they have 
promulgated a set of corollary rules and practices at the back end of 
criminal trials to protect the finality and inscrutability of verdicts.37 Most 
notably, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) forbids jurors from impeaching 
their own verdicts:  
During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during 
the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another 
juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or 
indictment. The court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a 
juror's statement on these matters.38 
Under this rule, jurors may only testify as to whether “extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention,” 
whether “an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any 
juror,” or “a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict 
form.”39 Courts have interpreted this rule to forbid jurors from impeaching 
 
33. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969) (quoting Ogull, 149 F. Supp. at 276).  
34. Id. (quoting GEORGE B. CLEMENTSON, A MANUAL RELATING TO SPECIAL VERDICTS AND 
SPECIAL FINDINGS BY JURIES 49 (1905)). 
35. United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Jackson, 542 F.2d at 413).  
36. Id. 
37. See generally Alschuler, supra note 8.  
38. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).  
39. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(A)–(C). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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their verdicts by admitting to misconduct in the jury room.40 This see-no-
evil doctrine was officially embraced by the Supreme Court in Tanner v. 
U.S. where, after convicting two co-defendants of conspiracy and mail 
fraud, jurors independently approached the defense attorney to “clear 
[their] conscience” and confess to serious juror misconduct.41 The jurors 
described the trial and deliberations as “one big party,” and reported that a 
number of them had consumed various types of alcohol, smoked 
marijuana, and ingested cocaine throughout the course of the 
proceedings.42 Jurors were reportedly falling asleep in the jury box, and 
one of them described himself as “flying.”43 Presented with sworn 
affidavits by the jurors, the Supreme Court refused to admit the evidence 
on the grounds that drug and alcohol abuse were not “an outside influence 
improperly brought to bear on any juror” under Rule 606.44 The Court’s 
opinion reflects an unwillingness to probe behind criminal verdicts, 
“solemnly made and publicly returned.”45 Even the claim by a juror that 
the jury did not “review the facts right” had no bearing for the majority: 
the jury had fulfilled its role by returning a general verdict of guilty; 
probing any further would “disrupt the integrity of the process.”46  
This principle is taken a step further when verdicts are inconsistent on 
their face.47 Courts, rather than inquire into the jury’s rationale in order to 
 
40. But see Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1933) (holding that the admission of 
testimony as to conduct of juror during deliberation of jury was not denial of juror's privilege against 
disclosure of happenings in jury room, where juror had sworn falsely in order to be accepted on the 
jury). For an argument that the Supreme Court misconstrued FED. R. EVID. 606, see Alschuler, supra 
note 8, at 219–21.  
41. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 115 (1987).  
42. Id. at 115–16.  
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 118, 127. 
45. Id. at 119 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 107, 267–268 (1987)).  
46. Id. at 116, 120. It should be noted that in March 2017 the Supreme Court finally recognized an 
exception to Rule 606. In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, where two jurors disclosed post-verdict that a 
member of the jury had expressed anti-Hispanic bias towards the defendant, the Court held that 
[w]here a juror makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or 
animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-
impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the 
juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.  
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). See also Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545 (2018).  
47. Verdicts are inconsistent when a jury “following the court's instructions could not have 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol59/iss1/13
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understand an inconsistent verdict, choose to accept the verdict as issued 
and assume that the jury exercised its power of nullification over one or 
more of the charges.48 The seminal Supreme Court case dealing with this 
issue is Dunn v United States.49 In Dunn, the defendant was indicted on 
three counts: maintaining a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a 
specified place intoxicating liquor, unlawful possession of intoxicating 
liquor, and unlawful sale of such liquor.50 The jury found the defendant 
guilty on the first count, and acquitted him on the last two, somehow 
finding that the defendant kept liquor for sale, but at the same time he 
neither possessed nor sold any liquor.51 Referencing a similar case in the 
Second Circuit, Steckler v. U.S., the Court determined that the verdict in 
this case showed that “either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did 
not speak their real conclusions,” but that it did not show that they were 
not convinced of the defendant's guilt.52 The Court interpreted the acquittal 
“as no more than [the jury’s] assumption of a power which they had no 
right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.”53  
In U.S. v. Maybury, the Second Circuit linked judicial acceptance of 
inconsistent verdicts to the arbitrary and inscrutable origins of the jury as 
an alternative to the ancient methods of compurgation and ordeal.54 
Quoting Professor Theodore Plucknett, the court explained that at first, 
jury verdicts were regarded as no more rational than ordeals, and “just as 
one did not question the judgments of God as shown by the ordeal, so the 
verdict of a jury was equally inscrutable.”55 While we now consider the 
jury to be a rational decision-making body, Steckler and Dunn show that 
“it has not yet been deemed wise that this process of rationalization should 
be carried to the point of requiring consistency in a jury's verdict in a 
criminal trial.”56  
 
produced them.” Muller, supra note 6, at 778.  
48. See Courselle, supra note 12, at 221–29; Alschuler, supra note 8, at 211–14.  
49. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932).  
50. Id. at 391–92. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 393 (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925)). 
53. Id.  
54. United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902–03 (2d Cir. 1960). 
55. Id. (quoting THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 125 
(1929)). 
56. Id. at 903.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
CURCI NOTE   8/7/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 59:217 
 
 
In the years following Dunn, several circuits attempted to carve narrow 
exceptions to the rule that consistency in the verdicts is unnecessary.57 In 
1984, however, the Supreme Court overturned one such lower court 
opinion in U.S. v Powell.58 The Powell Court rejected “as imprudent and 
unworkable” a rule that would allow criminal defendants to challenge 
inconsistent verdicts on the ground that the verdict was the product of an 
error, rather than of lenity: “such an individualized assessment of the 
reason for the inconsistency would be based either on pure speculation, or 
would require inquiries into the jury's deliberations that courts generally 
will not undertake.”59 Since jurors take an oath to follow the law as 
charged, the Court deemed it sufficient to take them at their word.60 
The judiciary’s commitment to keep the criminal verdict a riddle, 
wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma, is further underscored by a 
standard of review that defers to irrational jury determinations of fact.61 
On one end of the spectrum, there is the well-established doctrine that 
verdicts of acquittal are unreviewable by the trial court and non-
appealable.62 The government is precluded from being granted a directed 
 
[The judge] is ... supposed to submit an issue to the jury if, as the judges say, the jury can 
decide reasonably either way. But to say that I can decide an issue of fact reasonably either 
way is to say, I submit, that I cannot, by the exercise of reason, decide the question. That 
means that the issue we typically submit to juries is an issue which the jury cannot decide by 
the exercise of its reason. The decision of an issue of fact in cases of closely balanced 
probabilities, therefore, must, in the nature of things, be... [other] than a rational act. 
Charles P. Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV. 150, 166 (1952) (quoting Professor 
Jerome Michael, Address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1950)). 
57. See, e.g., United States v. Hannah, 584 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that if the jury finds 
defendant not guilty of a felony, they cannot convict her for using a communication facility in 
committing that same felony); United States v. Brooks, 703 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a 
conviction for using a communication facility in committing a conspiracy cannot be sustained if the 
defendant is acquitted of the underlying conspiracy).  
58. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984).  
59. Id. at 66.  
60. Id.; see also SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 90 (Stevens and Sons Ltd. 1956) (“I do not 
mean that juries are above the law. They should obey the law. But it is an obedience which they cannot 
be compelled to give. They are the wardens of their own obedience and are answerable only to their 
own conscience ”).  
61. See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 214–18.  
62. See United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 853 (5th Cir. 1971) (Rives, J., dissenting) (citing 
Bushel’s Case, 124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670)) (stating that the principle that a court may not direct a 
verdict of guilty in a criminal case is “so well-established that its basis is not normally a matter of 
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verdict or from obtaining a judgment notwithstanding the verdict “no 
matter how clear the evidence in support of guilt,” nor can it secure a new 
trial on the ground that an acquittal “was plainly contrary to the weight of 
the evidence.”63 This restriction, rooted in the Fifth Amendment, is 
generally understood as a key due process guarantee for criminal 
defendants.  
On the other end, courts also give a high degree of deference to jury 
determinations in cases of conviction. On paper, courts employ a standard 
of review in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction that “would amply guard” against wrongful convictions:64 
“whether a reasonably minded jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable 
doubt as to [a] defendant's guilt.”65 In making this assessment, however, 
courts must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the 
Government, and any conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in the 
Government's favor.66 Not only is this standard stacked in favor of the 
prosecution, but the reality is that in most cases a jury’s mistake in 
analyzing the evidence would not be subjected to any review at all. Most 
of the questions examined on appeal are procedural, rather than 
substantive: appellate courts typically review whether materials were 
properly admitted into evidence or whether there were any errors in the 
instructions submitted to the jury, rather than the reasonableness of the 
jury’s conclusions in light of the instructions and the evidence.67 Even if a 
deeper analysis were allowed, there is not much information an appellate 
 
discussion”).  
63. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980); see also United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 
671 (1896). 
64. See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 214. 
65. See, e.g., United States v. Gianni, 678 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Jones, 
418 F.2d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Fearn, 589 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Palmere, 578 F.2d 105, 106 (5th Cir. 1978).  
66. Fearn, 589 F.2d at 1321; United States v Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1979).  
67. Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 
480, 515 (1975). Unsurprisingly, the right to a criminal appeal, while granted to defendants in every 
jurisdiction, is not guaranteed by the Constitution. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) 
(stating that a review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case is not a necessary 
element of due process of law); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (acknowledging that “a State 
is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at 
all”); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (U.S. 1974) (reaffirming “the traditional principle that a State 
is not obliged to provide any appeal at all for criminal defendants”). 
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court could discern from a general verdict of “Guilty.” 
On the other hand, appellate review of the factual and legal basis of 
guilt is not without precedent in the American criminal justice system. 
While bench trials are by no means the norm where criminal adjudication 
is concerned, some jurisdictions require that judges deliver clearly 
reasoned opinions in support of their verdicts.68 The Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure require that, if a party so requests before the finding of 
guilty or not guilty, “the court must state its specific findings of fact in 
open court or in a written decision or opinion.”69 Not only must a court 
state its findings, but federal circuits have also ruled that the reasoning and 
conclusions “must be adequate to enable intelligent appellate review of 
the basis for the decision.”70 The “enhanced appealability” resulting from 
this rule provides an additional safeguard to criminal defendants: the 
greater the extent to which the decision-maker is called upon to justify a 
finding and the more clearly articulated the grounds for the decision, the 
more susceptible to challenge the basis of that decision becomes.71  
It is true that not all jurisdictions demand specific findings in open court 
or written opinions following bench trials, and that in those that do, the 
right to these findings must be positively asserted by the defendant.72 Still, 
the system, in some measure, holds judge and jury to different standards, 
and requiring reasoned judgments from one but not the other “is an 
implicit recognition that the sense of finality that attaches to the jury's 
verdict is of less force in the nonjury context.”73 This finding is not 
surprising, given the clear historical reasons for the difference in how we 
treat judges as finders of fact, dating all the way back to the colonial 
 
68. See Sean Doran, John D. Jackson & Michael L. Seigel, Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury 
Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 44–46 (1995).  
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c).  
70. United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 869 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (emphasis added) (citing 
United States v. Pinner, 561 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1977)).  
71. Doran et al., supra note 68, at 49.  
72. Arizona, Ohio, and Texas, for example, never require that the court make special findings in 
criminal trials. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 26.1(b) (defining “judgment” as “the court's adjudication that the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty based on […] the court's verdict); OHIO CRIM. R. 23(c) (prescribing 
that “in a case tried without a jury the court shall make a general finding”); Guadian v. State, 420 
S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (stating that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure does not 
require a trial court to make findings of facts and conclusions of law even following the defendant’s 
request).  
73. Doran et al., supra note 68 at 45.  
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period and the general sentiment of distrust directed at them as agents of 
the Crown.74 More than two centuries and one revolution later, however, 
bias, corruption, and the exercise of arbitrary power by members of the 
judiciary are not the only concerns that must be addressed.  
In U.S. v. Pinner, when the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the trial 
court for special findings, it did not do so because of alleged bias.75 
Rather, the Court found due to the lack of specificity in the trial court’s 
oral and written findings, it was unclear whether the trial judge had 
applied “the correct rule of law in evaluating the circumstantial evidence 
presented by the Government.”76 The Fifth Circuit’s ruling is an implicit 
recognition of the fact that mistakes in the interpretation and application of 
the law can and do happen, even when the process is entrusted to 
individuals learned in the law. Unfortunately, the vast majority of 
defendants standing trial before a jury of their untrained peers rather than a 
professional are afforded no such protection from misapplication of the 
law. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
As Justice Harlan articulated in his dissent in Duncan v. Louisiana,  
the principal original virtue of the jury trial – the limitations a jury 
imposes on a tyrannous judiciary – has largely disappeared. We no 
longer live in a medieval or colonial society. Judges enforce laws 
enacted by democratic decision, not by regal fiat. They are elected 
by the people or appointed by the people's elected officials, and are 
responsible not to a distant monarch alone but to reviewing courts, 
including this one.77 
 
74. In the late eighteenth century, judges were only allowed to try defendants for minor offenses, 
and in the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court recognized that a defendant could not waive his 
criminal jury trial right. Only in the twentieth century, when the Court considered whether the criminal 
jury trial provisions established a frame of government or simply guaranteed the right to the accused, 
the Court answered that the right was the defendant's and the jury trial was not part of the structure of 
government. Thomas, supra note 3. 
75. United States v. Pinner, 561 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). 
76. Id.  
77. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is important to note 
that Justice Harlan was not advocating for the abolition of the jury system, and neither is this Note. 
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If inscrutable general verdicts in criminal trials are no longer standing 
on their medieval or colonial foundations, and the Sixth Amendment does 
not require them, then on what basis are courts so adamantly preserving 
the practice? It is not uncommon for old institutions and rules to survive 
the customs and needs on which they were founded, and for legal 
doctrines to evolve.78 As the old rationales fade, some new ground or 
policy is advanced, “which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the 
present state of things; […] then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons 
which have been found for it, and enters on a new career.”79 But 
inscrutable general verdicts do not seem to have undergone this process. 
Literature and case law show that the very same rationales used to justify 
verdict inscrutability in 1765, such as jury independence from the arbitrary 
power of the judiciary, are the ones being advanced today.80 Rather than 
evolving alongside our legal institutions, verdict inscrutability seems to be 
stuck in the eighteenth century. 
This collective unwillingness to move forward is usually coupled with 
one of two attitudes. The first one is the romanticizing of the jury, 
regarded as the palladium of our freedom and the bulwark of our liberty. 
Despite their lack of training, juries are believed to have an “uncanny 
ability to grasp the truth and to provide common sense justice.”81 What 
underlies this view of the jury’s ability is a misplaced trust in an old 
institution because of the ideals it represents: civic engagement, 
community representation, and popular participation in the democratic 
system. If justice could be administered through sheer common sense, 
however, we likely would not need an extensive body of laws and an array 
of professional figures entrusted with drafting and enforcing them. We 
expect jurors to apply the law to the facts, not merely to make judgment 
 
Whether trial by jury still has a place and reason to exist in our modern, democratic society is an issue 
that goes beyond the scope of this analysis. Justice Harlan’s dissent was concerned with whether the 
State of Louisiana “was prohibited by the Constitution from trying charges of simple battery to the 
court alone,” an issue on which this Note also takes no position.  
78. For a discussion of the analytical framework of justification, see Ellen E. Sward, Justification 
and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389 (2004).  
79. Id. at 389 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881)).  
80. See, e.g., United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Spock, 
416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969).  
81. Alschuler, supra note 8 at 153.  
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calls.82 The idea that the system is working well as is, and that jurors 
somehow do not commit mistakes in applying the law flies in the face of 
facts.83 If the system accounts for the possibility that experienced judges 
might make these sort of mistakes, how can we expect lay people to be 
ready for the task?84  
One view that seeks to reconcile this discrepancy is that non-jury trials 
place a lot of responsibility on one fallible individual, and that jury trials 
instead diffuse responsibility for the decision and ensure accuracy through 
the deliberation process.85 The idea that twelve heads are better than one 
might certainly seem to be a matter of common sense. Indeed, the system 
validates this tenet through the use of judicial panels, rather than an 
individual judge, on appellate courts.86 But problems arise when the 
twelve heads belong to people drawn from the public at large. In most 
spheres of our lives, we would not dream that twelve lay people are more 
qualified than a professional with special education, training, and 
experience. This is not to say that the jury system does not present some 
advantages, or that community involvement in the justice system is of no 
 
82. This issue was settled for the federal system as early as 1895 in the case of Sparf v. United 
States, where Justice Harlan, writing for the majority of the Court, held that the jury in criminal cases 
is bound to follow the judge's instructions upon all matters of law. Sparf, 156 U.S. 51, 87–88 (1895); 
see also Dale W. Broeder, The Function of the Jury Facts or Fiction?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 404 
(1954).  
83. See supra note 4. Empirical studies also show how jurors are generally unable to follow limiting 
or curative instructions and end up instead focusing their attention on the inadmissible evidence. See 
Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social 
Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other 
Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677 (2000); R. L. Wissler & M. J. Saks, On the 
Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 
L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 37 (1985); Tanford, J. Alexander, Thinking About Elephants: Admonitions, 
Empirical Research and Legal Policy, 60 UMKC L. REV. 645 (1992). 
84. See supra notes 75–76.  
85. To the contrary, evidence shows that the deliberative process does not result in a correction of 
all the misunderstandings of the law: Ellsworth’s study showed how, while members of the jury fared 
pretty well in correcting misstatements of fact by fellow jurors, misstatements of law made during 
deliberations were only corrected in twelve percent of cases. Ellsworth, supra note 4 at 220–223. See 
also J. Kevin Wright, Comment, Misplaced Treasure: Rediscovering the Heart of the Criminal Justice 
System Through the Use of the Special Verdict, 19 COOLEY L. REV. 409 (2004). 
86. Of note, the only controversial exception to this rule is found in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims, which has the authority to allow the merits of appeals to be decided by 
a single judge rather than by a panel. See James D. Ridgway, Barton F. Stichman &, Rory E. 
Riley, "Not Reasonably Debatable": The Problems with Single-Judge Decisions by the Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 3 (2016).  
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value. The issue is not the we allow jurors to make determinations of guilt 
or innocence, but that we place their determinations under even less 
scrutiny than we do those of the judiciary. Even assuming that jurors are 
indeed better equipped than judges to make these determinations, 
subjecting their verdicts to review would only render the process more 
accurate.  
This leads us to a second objection often advanced against special 
verdicts in criminal trials: it is simply not feasible,87 we simply cannot 
require twelve jurors to come up with a coherent rationale for their 
decision. This concept clashes significantly with the romanticized view of 
jurors outlined above. Essentially, this argument states that while jurors 
are allegedly better equipped than judges to come to a just and proper 
decision in light of the law, they are somehow not equipped to explain 
their decision in a rational fashion. This objection betrays an underlying 
(and troubling) viewpoint – that in order to keep the judicial system 
working, there is a pragmatic need to accept a degree of imperfection.88 In 
other words, verdicts are, in a way like sausages: if we were to be given 
details as to how they are made, we might lose our appetite for them.89 
This preoccupation was well expressed by the words of W.R. Cornish: 
“[t]he absence of reasons for its decision is surely a characteristic which is 
bound to last so long as the jury system itself – once the inscrutability 
principle has gone, the time has come to set up another kind of tribunal.”90 
This view finds support in a number of the judicial opinions discussed in 
this Note, where the court, after discussing at length how the inscrutability 
of verdicts is necessarily embedded in the historical function of the jury, 
then mentioned, in passing, more pragmatic rationales.91  
In Tanner, for example, after acknowledging how “[t]here is little doubt 
that post-verdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some 
 
87. See John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477, 517–18 (2002); 
Nancy Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-Verdict Interviews of Jurors, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 465, 533–34 (1997).  
88. Clifford H. Ruprecht, Are Verdicts, Too, Like Sausages?: Lifting The Cloak of Jury Secrecy, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1997).  
89. Id.  
90. WILLIAM R. CORNISH, THE JURY 258 (1968).  
91. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987).; Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. 
Co., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948). 
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instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts,” Justice O’Connor observed 
how “it is not at all clear […] that the jury system could survive such 
efforts to perfect it.”92 As Judge Jerome Frank wrote in Skidmore v. Ohio, 
“[the General verdict] serves as the great procedural opiate, . . . [it] draws 
the curtain upon human errors and soothes us with the assurance that we 
have attained the unattainable.”93  
There are several issues that stem from the inscrutability of the general 
verdict, beyond the risk of wrongful convictions without a basis in law or 
in fact. One is the plight and lack of vindication for innocent, acquitted 
defendants.94 Since a general verdict gives no elucidation of the jury's 
reasoning, it necessarily treats all conclusions of non-guilt in the same 
manner.95 Thus, a verdict of acquittal can encompass a variety of 
situations: first, the defendant is factually guilty and the jury believed so, 
but the prosecutor failed to persuade all twelve jurors beyond a reasonable 
doubt that each element of the crime was proven; second, it is not clear 
whether the defendant is factually guilty, the evidence is confusing, and 
the jury reaches no consensus on whether the defendant committed the 
crime; third, the jurors exercise their power of nullification 
to acquit against the evidence a factually guilty defendant, of whose guilt 
they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt; and lastly, the defendant is 
factually innocent and the jurors are fully convinced of 
his innocence.96 When it comes to acquittals, then, “it would be hard to 
devise a verdict that is less informative than the one currently in use.”97 
The issue, then, is that a defendant who is factually innocent is never 
conclusively declared so: all we are told is that the government could not 
prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.98 For defendants who find 
themselves in such a predicament, it might be difficult to shed the stigma 
associated with a criminal charge and investigation, and “neighbors, 
 
92. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120. 
93. Skidmore, 167 F.2d at 61. 
94. Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
1297, 1299 (2000). 
95. Id. at 1302.  
96. Id.  
97. Id. See also U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (citing U.S. v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 
(1996) (Wallace, Chief J., dissenting)) (stating that “it is impossible to know exactly why a jury found 
a defendant not guilty on a certain charge.”). 
98. Leipold, supra note 94 at 1304. 
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acquaintances and co-workers may always wonder about the real basis of 
the acquittal or dismissal.”99 Not only that, but because an acquittal “is not 
a finding of any fact,”100 it does not preclude the Government from 
relitigating an issue in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard 
of proof, nor does it preclude a “sentencing court from considering 
conduct underlying the acquitted charge.”101  
Another casualty of the inscrutable general verdict is the law itself: 
while by the Sixteenth Century civil common law had evolved into one 
intellectual system, substantive criminal law is still relatively unrefined.102 
According to Milsom, the lack of development lies with the “blankness of 
the general verdict.”103 In civil cases, indeed, the availability of findings 
other than “guilty” or “not guilty” forced trial courts to face legal issues 
that helped shape the common law.104 Conversely, to this day, the law 
relating to a criminal case can only be found in appellate judgments.105 
This issue is closely related to that of achieving uniformity in the 
administration of the law. In Sparf v. U.S., “the Court spoke eloquently of 
the need for uniformity of statutory interpretation and administration, for a 
government of law and not of men, for legal signposts lighting the way for 
future adjudication as contrasted with the hit-or-miss blackness of the 
jury's general verdict.”106 In reality, however, different juries often end up 
deciding the law differently, making uniformity in the administration of 
justice impossible, as “[g]eneral verdicts are not stare decisis; no records 
are even kept of them.”107 As Judge Frank pointed out, jury-made law, 
 
99. Id. at 1305. An interesting example of this issue is the problem facing bar applicants who have 
been charged with a crime and then acquitted. In most states, arrest or charge with a criminal offense 
constitutes conduct that raises issues as to one’s character and fitness for the profession. When faced 
with further inquiry into their conduct, innocent, acquitted candidates would certainly benefit from a 
finding of factual innocence rather than an inscrutable finding of “not guilty.” See, e.g., Red Flags and 
Bar Admissions, La. State Bar Ass’n, 
http://files.lsba.org/documents/BarAdmissions/RedFlagsBarAdmi 
ssions.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
100. Watts, 519 U.S. at 155 (citing Putra, 78 F.3d at 1394 (Wallace, Chief J., dissenting)) 
101. Id. at 156-57.  
102. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 413 (London Butterworths, 
2d ed. 1981). See also Damaska, supra note 67, at 512, n.79.  
103. MILSOM, supra note 102 at 413.  
104. Id.  
105. Id.  
106. Broeder, supra note 82, at 403–04. 
107. Id.  
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“compared with judge-made law, is peculiar in form.”108 It does not issue 
general pronouncements, and it is not found in the law reports or in 
textbooks, nor does it become embodied in a series of precedents.109 Jury-
made law is nowhere codified: “[f]or each jury makes its own law in each 
case with little or no knowledge of or reference to what has been done 
before or regard to what will be done thereafter in similar cases."110 
 
III. PROPOSAL 
 
When thinking about possible alternatives to the general verdict, the 
first option that comes to mind would be the extension of special verdicts 
to criminal trials.111 As special verdicts are widely used in American civil 
courts, this solution would present relatively few problems of 
implementation. In addition, by allowing appellate courts to readily 
ascertain the basis for the jury’s decision, special verdicts have produced a 
number of benefits in civil trials, as they help prevent jurors from being 
swayed by prejudice or sympathy and identify other impermissible reasons 
on which they might have based their verdict.112 Knowing how the jury 
based its decision in case of error “can limit the number of retrials that 
must be conducted,” and appellate courts are better able to determine how 
much weight was given to the error by the jury when conducting a 
harmless-error analysis.113 By improving judicial and appellate review of 
jury decisions in civil cases, special verdicts have increased the efficiency 
of the system.114 Even more importantly, they allow society “to have 
greater confidence and reliance on jury verdicts by understanding the basis 
of their decisions.”115  
 
108. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 187 n.7 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930). See also 
Broeder, supra note 82. 
109. See FRANK, supra note 108.   
110. Id.  
111. For arguments in favor of special verdicts in criminal trials see, e.g., Kate H. Nepveu, Beyond 
“Guilty” or “Not Guilty”: Giving Special Verdicts in Criminal Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 
263 (2003); Alvin Stauber & Craig Varn, Itemized Verdict Requirements: A Challenge for Juries, FLA. 
B.J., June 1996, at 16; Wright, supra note 85.  
112. Wright, supra note 85 at 418–19. 
113. Id.  
114. Id.  
115. Id.   
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Special verdicts, however, are notoriously disfavored in criminal 
trials.116 Most of the criticism stems from the idea that special verdicts 
have a tendency to prejudice the defendant, as “special interrogatories that 
lead the jury on a path through the elements are thought to push the jury in 
the direction of a guilty verdict.”117 It is certainly possible that jurors might 
be influenced by the way particular questions are framed, and could feel 
pressured to return a verdict that conforms to what they understand to be 
the judge’s desired result. While this risk could be minimized through 
careful crafting of special interrogatories, due to their long history at 
common law, they come with a lot of baggage. As easy as it might be to 
implement within the procedural framework currently in place, a solution 
involving the use of special verdicts in criminal trials would likely be met 
with a great deal of resistance. Moreover, since a true special verdict 
“involves no determinative, ultimate verdict from a jury but only a 
statement of facts the jury have found from which the judge determines 
the appropriate judgment,” special verdicts erode the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to have the ultimate determination of guilt rest with a 
jury of her peers.118 
Continental legal systems offer some interesting alternatives. One of 
them is the “collaborative model,” a mixed court comprised of both lay 
citizens and law-trained judges, which in some cases operate at both the 
trial court as well as at the appellate court level.119 The first variation 
within the collaborative model is the “Schöffen Court,” a German tribunal 
comprised of one professional judge and two lay citizens.120 In this model, 
 
116.  
As a general rule...special verdicts...in criminal cases are disfavored. The reason is that they 
are generally thought to harm the defendant. Special verdicts are thought to put pressure on 
the jury to report its deliberations or support its verdict; they are thought to “conflict with the 
basic tenet that juries must be free from judicial control and pressure in reaching their 
verdicts.” A general verdict, on the other hand, does not lead or fetter the jury and in addition 
allows for jury nullification. 
United States v. Acosta, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1075–76 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
117. Id.  
118. See Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 443 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Mass. 1982).  
119. Jane E. Dudzinski, Note, Justification for Juries: A Comparative Perspective on Models of Jury 
Composition, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1615, 1620 (2013).  
120. Id. While this is the standard composition, the number of jurors could change based on the 
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the lay jurors sit with the judge at the head of the room, and instead of 
being selected for each proceeding are appointed as members of the court 
for terms of several months.121 
A second variation is found in France, in the form of a 
“hybrid model which represents a via media between the 
continental jury courts and the Schöffen Courts.”122 While the model still 
involves citizens and judges deliberating together, the ratio of citizens to 
judges is higher: a jury may be composed of three judges and nine or even 
twelve citizens, depending on the type of court. Like in the American 
system, the lay jurors sit apart from the judge in the courtroom until 
deliberation, and are drawn at random from the community.123 The last 
type of collaborative court is the “expert assessor model,” which pairs the 
expertise of one or more judges with two or three lay jurors who have 
specialized knowledge and experience that is relevant to a case.124 
All of these options, however, present even deeper issues concerning 
jury independence than special verdicts: if there is a concern that judges 
might unduly influence jurors through the mere act of asking specific 
questions, then it is hard to conceive of a mixed tribunal in which the jury 
is truly independent. The risk is that judges in collaborative courts would 
end up dominating the conversation during deliberation, and that lay jurors 
might not feel comfortable disagreeing with a judge’s interpretation of the 
evidence and her ultimate conclusions. Jurors would probably attribute a 
greater weight to a judge’s opinion or recollection of the evidence 
presented than they would to that of a fellow juror.  
A better model from which we could draw upon is the Spanish one: 
“[t]he Spanish Constitution guarantees the people's right to participate in 
the administration of justice through a jury trial and also requires that 
justifications be provided for all judgments.”125  The Organic Law on the 
 
specifics of the case, such as the nature of the crime or punishment involved. 
121. Id.  
122. John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe, 13 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 97 (2007). See also Dudzinski, supra note 119, at 1621.  
123. Dudzinski, supra note 119, at 1620–21.  
124. Id.  
125. Michael Csere, supra note 10, at 421; see also Dennis P. Riordan, The Rights to a Fair Trial 
and to Examine Witnesses Under the Spanish Constitution and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 378–81 (1999); Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury 
Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1999, at 233.. 
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Jury (“L.O.T.J.”) Court of 1995126 requires Spanish juries, composed of 
nine jurors and two alternates, to “articulate a succinct explanation of the 
reasons why they have declared, or refused to declare, certain facts as 
having been proved,” as well as “list the questions or propositions it has 
found to be proved or not proved, note whether each vote was unanimous 
or by a majority, and list the evidence upon which it has relied in 
determining the verdict.”127 Several provisions in the L.O.T.J. provide 
“what appear to be safeguards against insufficiently reasoned jury 
verdicts, aimed at ensuring the adequacy of the jury's 
explanations.”128 After reaching a verdict, the jury may summon the 
secretary of the court, who holds a law degree, for help in expressing its 
explanation while formulating its reasons.129 Before issuing the final 
judgment, the judge reviews the verdict and explanation, and if he 
determines that certain standards have not been met in ensuring their 
sufficiency he may return the verdict and explanation to the jury.130 The 
judge also has the power to dissolve the jury “if he finds that no 
inculpatory evidence upon which the defendant could be convicted existed 
in the trial.”131  
A reform modeled after the Spanish system would not present the same 
issues of jury independence as the proposals explored above. 
Independence from the court would be safeguarded by allowing the jury to 
reach a conclusion autonomously before having to formulate its reasoning, 
unlike in the collaborative model. If needed, jurors would be allowed to 
enlist the assistance of the secretary of the court. While the secretary of the 
court would be learned in the law, such a person would not pose the same 
level of threat to jury independence as a judge would due to the respective 
 
126. For a history of jury trial legislation in 19th century Spain, see Stephen C. Thaman, Spain 
Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 246–49 (1998) (citing JUAN 
ANTONIO ALEJANDRE, LA JUSTICIA POPULAR EN ESPAÑA: ANÁLYSIS DE UNA EXPERIENCIA 
HISTÓRICA: LOS TRIBUNALES DE JURADOS 79–243 (1981)). 
127. Csere, supra note 10; see also Stephen C. Thaman, Should Criminal Juries Give Reasons for 
Their Verdicts?: The Spanish Experience and the Implications of the European Court of Human Rights 
Decision in Taxquet v. Belgium, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613, 628–30 (2011); Jury Court Law art. LXI 
(B.O.E. 1995, 122) (Spain).  
128. Csere, supra note 10, at 422–23.  
129. Id.  
130. Id.  
131. Id.  
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positions and authority within the tribunal and society. Moreover, the 
decision of whether to ask for help would be left entirely to the jurors 
themselves, further preserving their independence. Receiving assistance 
from the secretary would also assuage the concern that lay jurors might 
not have the means to write a full, cogent and well-reasoned opinion on 
their own.132 The transition would likely take time: in Spain the adequacy 
of reasons for verdicts presented a considerable hurdle during the first 
years of implementation, leading to the overturning of a number of 
verdicts due to inadequate reasoning.133 However, the issue was 
significantly ameliorated as judges gained experience in how to properly 
and effectively instruct juries and the Supreme Court of Spain developed a 
considerable body of jurisprudence related to the adequacy of reasoned 
opinions.134 The Court’s currently favored approach, the “intermediate” 
one, “supports an itemized specification of all points relevant to the 
evidence without requiring the accuracy of judicial reasoning.”135 There is 
no reason, then, why we should doubt the ability of American juries to 
accomplish this same task. If we feel comfortable entrusting them with 
another person’s life and liberty, we should trust that they can articulate 
the path to their decision. A corollary critique sometimes advanced with 
regards to reasoned verdicts is that juries might reach unanimity as to the 
ultimate verdict, but disagree on the underlying rationale.136 However, 
requiring a reasoned verdict would ensure that the jurors spend more time 
examining and debating all the evidence, and any points of contention or 
divergence would be addressed more thoroughly and carefully during 
deliberations. Disagreement as to the relevance and weight of pieces of 
evidence should be used as a basis to consider whether the evidence truly 
shows that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than be 
 
132. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  
133. Csere, supra note 10, at 423, see also Thaman, supra note 127, at 628–30.  
134. Csere, supra note 10, at 423.  
135. Id. at 424. Other approaches considered were the “maximalist” and “minimalist” interpretations: 
the first one requires “a thorough description of the whole deliberation process and … a declaration 
that certain facts have or have not been proven,” while the second “permits general references to the 
evidence with less detail.” See also Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line for 12 Angry Men: 
Verdicts Reached by Majority Rule – The Spanish Perspective, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 759, 770–71 
(2007).  
136. See Marder, supra note 87; Case Note, Trial-Polling of Jury – Effect of a Juror's Dissent, 39 
YALE L. J. 1218 (1930).  
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swept under the rug of inscrutability.  
This Note does not suggest that we should import the Spanish model as 
a whole, as differences between the two systems would make such 
implementation cumbersome and unnecessary.137 However, the Spanish 
experience shows that a fairer and more transparent jury system, where the 
rights of criminal defendants are safeguarded without infringing upon jury 
independence, is attainable. We only need to trust that our jurors are 
indeed as competent as we set them up to be.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Note argues that justice would be better served if criminal juries 
were required to return not only a verdict, but a reasoned one that explains 
its underlying rationale, learning from the experience of the Spanish jury 
reform of 1995. This proposal would entail allowing the jury, after having 
independently reached a verdict through deliberations, to request the 
assistance of an officer of the court, trained in the law, to express their 
reasoning and findings. This solution would enable our jurors to 
accomplish this task without jeopardizing their independence from the 
court. The findings could then be reviewed by the trial judge and furnish 
an additional basis for appellate review, leading to an increase in 
 
137. For example, in Spain unanimity is not required: seven out of nine votes are sufficient for a 
finding of guilt, while five out of nine are enough to secure an acquittal. See Thaman, supra note 127, 
at 254. While the U.S. Constitution does not require unanimity in criminal trials, currently forty-nine 
out of fifty states have such unanimity requirement, after Louisiana voted on November 6, 2018 to 
abolish split jury verdicts, leaving Oregon as the sole outlier. See Jordan S. Rubin, Louisiana Vote for 
Unanimous Juries May Not Be Last Word, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.c 
om/us-law-week/louisiana-vote-for-unanimous-juries-may-not-be-last-word. See also Apodaca v. 
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); see also Ashley Garcia, Patching the Exhaust Pipe: A Historical 
Analysis of Oregon’s Non-Unanimous Jury Law in Criminal Cases, 54 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 113 
(2018). This, too, might soon change, as the Supreme Court in March 2019 granted certiorari to Ramos 
v. Louisiana, a case that presents the very question of whether the XIV amendment fully incorporates 
the VI amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict. Ramos v. Louisiana, No. 18-5924, 2019 WL 
1231752, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2019); Debra Cassens Weiss, Are Unanimous Juries Required in State 
Criminal Cases?, ABA J. (Mar. 18, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/are-unanimous-
juries-require 
d-in-criminal-cases-supreme-court-to-consider-overruling-1972-case/.   
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efficiency and accuracy. 
Regardless of one’s stance on the competence of our jurors, there are a 
number of reasons in favor of having juries explain the reasoning behind 
their verdict. For critics of the jury system and of jurors’ biases and 
capabilities, having an opportunity to inquire into the jury’s reasoning 
might assuage their concerns that cases might be wrongly decided, never 
to be appealed or overturned. Admirers of the current system would also 
reap the benefits brought about by increased transparency. Lastly, 
reasoned jury verdicts would serve a clear educational purpose, and could 
lead us to discover and tackle serious legal or systemic issues rather than 
blame a disagreeable verdict on the quirks of a particular jury.  
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